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ARGUMENT 
.1 . 
AN ACTUAL PHYSICAL "TAKING" HAS BEEN EFFECTED 
The Court of Appeals should keep in mind about what 
THIS CASE is actually about: it is about a "taking" of 
private property for public use and for which the 
government here Salt Lake County has creatively and 
successfully resisted the Constitutions' command that "just 
compensation" be paid! 
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This case does not involve a "regulatory taking" (such 
as a zoning ordinance which prescribes limitations on 
certain uses, thus diminishing the value of the real 
property). This case presents an ACTUAL, PHYSICAL, 
POSSESSION-PRECLUDING "TAKING" IN THE CLASSIC SENSE. Thus, 
the applicable court decisions such as Nollan and Dolan 
involving such "takings" and which have been decided at 
the state and national level should be the Court's initial 
focus and inquiry. 
The "regulatory takings" cases cited by the COUNTY, 
although perhaps enlightening, are not directly on point. 
However, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 107 SCt 3141 (1987) 
[hereinafter "Nollan"] and Dolan vs City of Tigard, 114 SCt 
2309 (1994) [hereinafter "Dolan"] are EXACTLY ON POINT AND 
ARE CONTROLLING notwithstanding the assertions of the 
Defendant to the contrary! Nollan and Dolan which concerned 
the actual dedication and physical occupation of real 
property, WHICH IS THE SITUATION-AT-HANDi 
This case is NOT about some ethereal, speculative 
damages which might have happened (for example, under a 
"regulatory taking"). "Regulatory takings" cases, being 
intrinsically speculative, are frequently disposed of as 
being not "ripe for judicial decision". See Williamson 
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County Regional Planning Commission vs Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 US 172 (1985) and Palazzolo vs Rhode 
Island, 533 US 606 (2001) . Williamson and Palazzolo both 
involved "regulatory takings" (such as a zoning ordinance 
which limited "uses" of an owner's land): the owner retained 
ownership and possession. Thus, it would be proper to assure 
that the government had actually come to a "final decision" 
as to the scope and depth of its ordinance, before the 
courts took over. However, in the instant case, the case is 
ABSOLUTELY "RIPE" for decision: the Plaintiff has been 
forced to give up his property! Similarly, the Plaintiff HAS 
IN FACT "exhausted" its administrative remedies. Four 
distinct "letters of claim" letters were written to the 
COUNTY in the spring and early summer of 1998 advising the 
COUNTY of Plaintiff's "constitutional" claims (vis-a-vis the 
required roadway improvements) . Those assertions together 
with face-to-face meetings with the COUNTY administrative 
staff and the COUNTY Planning Commission were consistently 
rebuffed and ignored. Finally, the COUNTY Board of 
Commissioners (County Commission) DENIED the Plaintiff's 
request for a hearing on the issues. And after all of that, 
the COUNTY still had AN ENTIRE YEAR---from August 1998 (when 
the lawsuit was filed) until August 1999 (when the Westridge 
Meadows subdivision was finally approved) in which to 
reconsider its requirements. So to say that the Plaintiff 
failed to "exhaust its administrative remedies" is 
intellectually-dishonest, disingenuous, and contrary to the 
truth and the evidence in the case! 
This case is not, at this time, about a "facial" 
challenge to the COUNTY'S ordinance requirements. [Plaintiff 
does acknowledge that the "facial" unconstitutionality of 
the COUNTY'S ordinances and regulations was initially 
pleaded. However, with the passage of time and the ultimate 
approval of the development albeit with the 53-foot 
roadway dedication and improvement required the "facial" 
challenge has effectively MERGED INTO and been totally 
consumed by the "as applied" nature of the "taking". Thus, 
most if not all of the argument and analysis the COUNTY 
has undertaken in pages 13 through 25 of its BRIEF is 
incorrectly presented.] 
Furthermore, the COUNTY has consistently taken the 
position that the provisions of its ordinances cannot be 
wavered and that those provisions will be enforced, as 
written. That position has been reaffirmed in this Court. To 
now claim that the COUNTY might have changed its position if 
it (the COUNTY) had been asked to do so is disingenuous, 
intellectually-dishonest, and contrary to the evidence. [The 
Plaintiff presented evidence that the Plaintiff attempted to 
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negotiate with the COUNTY to not install the required 
improvements, etc., until the roadway was actually widened 
by UDOT. That approach was REJECTED by the COUNTY, which 
mandated the present installation of all of the improvements 
and the full dedication of the entire 53-foot half-width 
right-of-way!] 
This case presents claims for ACTUAL, PROVEN ECONOMIC 
COSTS AND EXPENSES the Plaintiff-Appellant was 
unconstitutionally FORCED to incur, including but not 
limited to: 
1. The value of the real estate from the existing 
edge of the existing pavement of 3500 South to the 
fully improved (paved) width thereof, to the 53-
foot "half-width" of the improved roadway; AND 
2. The value of the engineering, roadway 
preparation and materials (such as roadbase and 
asphalt) the Plaintiff-Appellant was forced to 
purchase in the development of that roadway; AND 
3 . The value of the related improvements mandated 
upon the developer, namely: 
a. the costs associated with the ; 
installation of almost 900 linear feet of 
curb, gutter, and sidewalk, along the 
3500 South Street right-of-way; AND 
c 
b. the costs of relocating and/or 
improving a pre-existing underground 
storm drainage line located within the 
3 5 00 South Street right-of-way; AND 
c. the costs of relocating several 
(i.e. 6) electrical power line poles, to 
accommodate the mandated street widening; 
AND 
4. The value of installing almost 900 linear feet 
of impassable fencing along the south side of the 
street improvements, thus effectively denying the 
abutting residents any value (or "benefit") to 
such street improvements, which benefit ONLY the 
public-at-large; AND 
5. The value of two "building lots" lost because 
of the excessive in-kind dedications (of real 
estate) required by Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
The Plaintiff's unrebutted testimony as to the aggregate 
value of the foregoing "costs" and/or "losses" was $200,000-
--which the Plaintiff was coerced to "pay" when similarly-
situated developers were required to pay NOTHING! [The 
electrical power line relocation and the underground storm 
sewer line were NOT necessitated by the development of the 
subject subdivision! Such relocations were effected as 
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required by the COUNTY strictly as part of the 
comprehensive improvement of the 3500 South Street roadway.] 
This case comes down to a relatively simple question: 
is it "reasonable" to require the single propertyowner (the 
Plaintiff, as developer) to pay 100% of those roadway 
improvement costs, when his development contributes less 
than 3% of the roadway traffic utilizing the roadway? Nollan 
says "No!". Dolan says "No!" Banberry Development 
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah 1981) 
and the Utah appellate court decisions say "No!" But then 
Defendant COUNTY says those decisions and principles don't 
apply! How creative and novel the COUNTY is to avoid the 
requirements of the Constitutions that the government pay 
for those improvements! 
• ' II ' 
THE COUNTY'S GEOGRAPHY-BASED AS CONTRASTED WITH 
AN IMPACT-BASED METHOD OF OBTAINING PUBLIC 
ROADWAY IMPROVEMENTS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY has been surprisingly 
candid in acknowledging and defending the geography-based 
method of requiring roadway improvements, as a pre-condition 
for development approval of "abutting properties". 
Fundamentally, the COUNTY'S approach is relatively simple: 
if the development is adjacent to the mapped right-of-way 
lines of a major roadway, the developer must pay 100% of the 
costs! Similarly-situated developers in the immediate area, 
contributing the exact same "impact" (i.e. measured in 
vehicles on the roadway) , PAY NOTHING if their parcels don't 
abut the designated roadway! 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 
cases of Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 107 SCt 
3141 (1987) [hereinafter "Nollan"] and Dolan vs City of 
Tigard, 114 SCt 2309 (1994) [hereinafter "Dolan"] are THE 
DEFINITIVE CASES for these "roadway dedication/in-kind 
exaction" claims. 
The COUNTY argues [p. 3 6 et seq of its BRIEF before 
this Court] and the District Court accepted the COUNTY'S 
argument that the "rational basis" case law decisions 
such as Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama vs 
Garrett, 121 SCt 955 (USSCt 2001) are controlling in the 
case-at-hand and that the "takings" case law decisions 
such as Nollan and Dolan are inappropriate. WRONG! WRONG! 
WRONG! 
The inappropriateness of the Garrett decision is 
readily demonstrated by the background facts of the decision 
itself. Garrett involved claims of discrimination against 
"disabled persons" and whether certain congressionally-
adopted provisions ran afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. Any 
"rational basis" analysis, testing and/or conclusion using 
the "constitutional law" standards discussed in Garrett are 
clearly inappropriate, particularly in light of the clearly-
applicable fact situations presented in Nollan and in Dolan! 
Similarly, the COUNTY'S reliance and the District 
Court's recitation of "rational basis" cases such as 
Little America Hotel vs Salt Lake City Corporation, 785 P. 2d 
1106 (Utah Supreme Court 1989) is similarly misplaced. 
Little America Hotel involved a generalized claim of "denial 
of equal protection". Little America Hotel involving the 
"innkeeper's tax" is limited in its jurisprudential 
application. There is no expressed "constitutional right" to 
be immune from an "innkeeper's tax". BUT THERE ARE EXPRESS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN BOTH THE NATIONAL AND THE 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS WHICH REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO PAY 
"COMPENSATION" WHEN PRIVATE PROPERTY IS TAKEN FOR "PUBLIC 
USE"I1 i 
In this context, the situation-at-hand is correctly 
analyzed and anticipated by the United States Supreme Court 
in the following clear-cut description: 
xIt is noteworthy and almost unbelievable how creative 
governments and their civil-servant attorneys can be in IGNORING 
THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS THEY---like the judges of 
this Court---ARE SWORN TO UPHOLD! 
While attorneys and judges might be able to argue the 
sophistries and mysteries of such nebulous concepts as "free 
speech" under the First Amendment or "unreasonable searches" under 
the Fourth Amendment, the clear mandate of the Takings Clause (s) is 
beyond serious intellectual discussion! The Constitutions mandate 
that governments pay for the private property taken! 
We view the Fifth Amendments property clause to 
be more than a pleading requirement, and 
compliance with it more than an exercise in 
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, 
our cases describe the condition for abridgement 
of property rights through the police power as a 
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State 
interest. We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the objective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that 
context there is a heightened risk that the 
purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. 
In the case-at-hand, the Defendant COUNTY and the 
District Court have engaged in an "exercise in cleverness 
and imagination". The COUNTY'S arguments albeit candidly 
admitting the operational effect of its highway-abutting 
dedication requirement certainly illuminate the 
"heightened risk" that the purpose of the dedication 
requirement is the "avoidance of the compensation 
requirement"! As such, that's simply constitutionally 
impermissible! 
The COUNTY cites [p. 15 of its BRIEF] to the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Lucas vs 
South Carolina Coastal Commission, 112 SCt 2886 (USSCt 1992) 
and quotes its "holding" as 
"... [a] statute regulating the uses that can be 
made of property effects a taking if it "denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land". 
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Id. at 2894. The COUNTY then asserts that because the 
developer still had 44 lots of real estate left, there was 
no unconstitutional taking. WRONG! The COUNTY through the 
"dedication" and improvement requirement HAS IN FACT AND 
IN LAW "taken" the 53 feet roadway area and has denied the 
owner (the Plaintiff) of all "economically viable use" of 
his land! The real estate was, through coercion, dedicated 
to the public. The developer no longer owns the property. 
The property is now a public street! What possible "economic 
use" could be made thereof by the developer (as an "owner")? 
[Lucas, being a "regulatory taking", is for that reason 
alone, technically inapplicable to the case-at-hand, which 
involves an ACTUAL, POSSESSORY TAKING!] 
The COUNTY asserts [p. 38 of its BRIEF] that the 
residents of the Westridge Meadows gain a benefit from the 
"widened" (improved) condition of the 3500 South Street 
roadway. WRONG! The evidence (testimony from Andrea Pullos, 
County Traffic Engineer) was that the widening would shave 
a few seconds off the drive time. The residential 
propertyowners other than as members of the public at 
large gain NO DEFINABLE BENEFIT in the widened roadway. In 
fact, there is almost a detrimental effect of being adjacent 
to a major 5-lane or 7-lane roadway! The COUNTY-mandated 
impassable "fencing" along the south right-of-way line of 
the roadway prevents any of those residents from gaining 
direct access to 3500 South Street. 
This situation must certainly be contrasted with a 
"commercial" development, such as a shopping center. In the 
"commercial" setting, the developer would probably welcome 
the opportunity for a 7-lane roadway in front of its 
shopping center! That propertyowner wants as much visibility 
and accessibility as possible. For a shopping center, there 
would be a 4-lane "driveway-entrance" into the parking lot 
couple of hundred feet. And the "commercial" developer gets 
full advantage of the roadway improvements curb, gutter, 
sidewalk because the developer INSTALLS THEM ONLY ONCE. In 
the "residential" setting for example, Westridge Meadows--
-the Plaintiff was required to install TWO SETS of curb, 
gutter and sidewalk: one set on the "internal" street 
actually used by the residences of the subdivision and a 
SECOND set along 3500 South Street, which because of the 
COUNTY-mandated fencing cannot be used at all by the 
residents! These are the ACTUAL DOLLARS "costs" which this 
litigation sought to recover! 
The immediately adj acent subdivision Elusive Meadows, 
to the south had essentially the SAME IMPACT! Yet Elusive 
Meadows PAYS NOTHING! And it is the developer not the 
residents who actually ends of paying these expenses, 
because he cannot effectively divide the $200,000 "cost" 
across the 44 lots he was allowed (= about $4500 per "lot" 
increase) and still remain competitive with the "building 
lots" in Elusive Meadows a hundred yards away* Thus, one 
person the developer effectively shoulders the financial 
burden which should be shouldered by ALL! [In this same 
vein, were the COUNTY to have it doesn't a "road impact 
fee", then perhaps the adjoining Elusive Meadows would be 
paying something (ala, its "proportionate share") for the 
roadway improvement expenses. But per state statute, the 
COUNTY is prohibited from assessing a "road impact fee" for 
improving State- and Federal-controlled roadways! The 
"bottom line" is that Elusive Meadows PAYS NOTHING and the 
Plaintiff PAYS EVERYTHING! That's not "reasonable"! It's not 
"equal protection". And it's not constitutional! 
The COUNTY argues [p. 3 7 of its BRIEF before this 
Court] that the Plaintiff-developer, having purchased the 
subject real estate after the "highway-abutting dedication 
requirements" were in place, thus should have known of such 
requirements and should be deemed to have waived any right 
to claim "just compensation". This spurious argument is 
SIMPLY WRONG for at least two reasons: 
First, because the logical conclusion (i.e. no 
compensation is paid) ignores the clear mandate of 
the Constitutions. . ' 
Secondly, because it ignores the practical 
effect of the COUNTY'S "program" upon the ORIGINAL 
LANDOWNER, who arguably (hypothetically) owned the 
real estate BEFORE the government adopted its 
"program" (of uncompensated "takings"). 
This latter reason can be illustrated by a simple 
hypothetical situation. The Court will be familiar generally 
with the Utah Department of Transportation [UDOT] proposal 
to build the "Legacy Highway" through Davis County, between 
the existing 1-15 freeway and the eastern boundary of the 
Great Salt Lake. If, for example, a given landowner (of real 
estate within the planned "right-of-way" of the "Legacy 
Highway" alignment) were to sell that real estate to a 
private "buyer", would that "buyer" be deemed to have 
forfeited his right to claim "just compensation" in eminent 
domain proceedings filed by UDOT to acquire the necessary 
real estate? ABSOLUTELY NOT! 
The SALT LAKE COUNTY situation is NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
DIFFERENT! Merely because the COUNTY may have adopted years 
ago "a plan" does not excuse the COUNTY from obeying the 
clear mandate of the Constitutions. The "plan" (requiring 
highway-abutting developers to pay ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF 
THE COSTS of such "public use" roadways) is not, in-and-of-
itself, justification under the "rational basis" analysis of 
the court decisions improperly cited by the COUNTY, when 
Nollan and Dolan are so directly on point! 
CONCLUSION - -l 
Nollan and Dolan are THE DEFINITIVE CASES (at the 
federal level) for this case! Simply stated, the COUNTY'S 
dedication and improvement requirements, contained within 
its adopted and consistently enforced ordinances, offend the 
constitutional principles described in Nollan and Dolan and 
in the Utah appellate court decisions! The COUNTY'S approach 
is simply a self-serving method of AVOIDING the clear 
MANDATE of the CONSTITUTIONS that the costs of the public 
improvements should be borne by the public-at-large, and not 
merely this single propertyowner! 
Not only is the Takings Clause implicated, but "equal 
protection" (under the national Constitution) and "uniform 
operation of laws" (under the Utah Constitution) principles 
are violated by the COUNTY'S approach, in which similarly-
situated developers are treated with great disparity! 
The decision of the District Court decided upon an 
incorrect legal basis must be set aside and the case 
remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, 
awarding it the "just compensation" for the "private 
property taken for public use". 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of June, 2002 
i ^ ^ * ^ 2 — 
Atjz^rney for Appellant 
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